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In this paper we investigate the effects of subsidizing low-skilled, labour-intensive 
services hired by high-skilled individuals in the presence of labour income taxation. 
Whether such a subsidy can be Pareto-improving depends crucially on the degree of 
substitutability of both types of labour in the non-service sector. In case of some 
substitutability, a service subsidy can benefit all and decrease inequality, but in case 
of complementarity, low-skilled individuals benefit and high-skilled individuals are 
worse off. 
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 1 Introduction
Stimulating labour market participation is high on the political agenda in
many countries. This had led to a wide variety of measures, among which
subsidized child care is one of the most striking examples: the direct and
indirect subsidies for child care costs incurred by a dual-earner family range
from 10% in the United Kingdom to more than 40% for Germany and The
Netherlands (see Table 1). Another example is the application of a reduced
VAT rate to certain labour-intensive services by member states of the EU,
that intends to create jobs and reduce the ’black economy’. Comparing this
with the standard VAT rate, this actually boils down to subsidizing these
services relative to other goods by about 10% (see Table 1). These policies
have in common that they focus on favouring services that can quite easily
be substituted by home-produced services. Because these services cannot
be taxed, a tax on labour income not only distorts the consumption-leisure
decision, but also the decision to hire market services, as it reduces the
opportunity costs of providing home-produced services relative to the price of
hired services. As was pointed out by Sandmo (1990), this leads to a distorted
division of labour and consequently, substantial eﬃciency losses. Applying
the theory of optimal taxation, Kleven et al. (2000) conclude that these
market-produced services should be taxed at lower rates, which is also found
by Kleven (2004) who argues that commodities which require little household
time should be taxed at a lower rate than goods that are complements for
leisure. Similar results were reported by Lindbeck (1982) and Bergstrom and
Blomquist (1996), who focus on child care services and ﬁnd that subsidizing
these services increases labour supply to such an extent that tax rates do
not have to rise, or can even decrease, especially if the market production of
day care involves economies of scale, as in Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998). In
a recent paper, Domeij and Klein (2009) apply a life-cycle model and show
that especially if child-rearing is conﬁned to a small part of the life cycle,
tax deductibility of day care expenses is welfare improving because it allows
distortions to be spread over diﬀerent periods which reduces the total excess
burden.
Although many have found supporting arguments for (tax-) subsidizing
1services, particularly child care, others doubt the eﬃciency enhancing eﬀects.
Rosen (1995) assumes a much smaller degree of substitutability between mar-
ket and home produced services and concludes that there is a clear upper
limit for subsidization of services to be desirable, beyond which the eﬃciency
costs of higher taxes, needed to ﬁnance the subsidies, outweigh the bene-
ﬁts. Likewise, Mumford (2008) considers time spent on services, such as
raising children, to be leisure time. With endogenous fertility, complemen-
tarity of children and leisure implies it is not optimal to subsidize child care.
Blomquist et al. (2009) apply a model with diﬀerent skill levels that are
unobservable for the government, which redistributes income through a pro-
gressive tax system. Subsidizing services (that are required in order to work)
by making these expenses tax deductible is found to be welfare decreasing as
it induces high-skilled persons to work less and mimic low-skilled individuals.
Instead of concentrating on the degree of substitutability between home-
provided services and services hired on the market, in this paper, we focus
on the substitutability of low and high-skilled labour in the productive sector
and the general-equilibrium eﬀects that a service subsidy brings about, both
of which have so far received little attention. Providing services requires low-
skilled labour, while both high and low-skilled labour is needed to produce
commodities. This implies that the market price of services is determined
by the wage of a low-skilled person.1 When deciding to hire services, a high-
skilled person compares this to his net wage; if the latter is lower due to a high
wage tax, home-provision is more attractive for the individual. However, from
a macroeconomic point of view, this is not eﬃcient. The time spent by the
high-skilled individual on home-provided services could have been used more
productively by working. An obvious way to solve this is to decrease the tax.
As we will show, this is only possible without loss of government revenues if
both types of labour are very substitutable. Otherwise, subsidizing services
is the second-best option to assure the same amount of revenues and grasp
the beneﬁts of more specialization. General-equilibrium eﬀects determine to
whom these beneﬁts fall: on the one hand, high-skilled individuals beneﬁt
1We abstract from a consumption tax or VAT. Adding this would not change the
results. The subsidy on services can then also be interpreted as a tax subsidy in the form
of a lower consumption tax or VAT.
2from receiving the subsidy and the opportunity to earn a higher income, but
their increasing labour supply puts downward pressure on the return to high-
skilled labour. On the other hand, a higher demand for low-skilled labour
in the services sector makes it more scarce in the productive sector, which
has an upward eﬀect on the wage of low-skilled labour and hence on the
price of services. Again, the substitution elasticity of high and low-skilled
labour is the determining factor. In case of rather high substitutability, a
service subsidy can be both Pareto-improving and decrease inequality, but
in case of complementarity, such a subsidy beneﬁts low-skilled individuals
while harming the high-skilled.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model, Section 3 focuses on market distortions for diﬀerent degrees of substi-
tutability of high and low-skilled labour, and analyses the eﬀects of reducing
the tax rate, providing service subsidies and making service expenses tax
deductible. Section 4 concludes and discusses ideas for further research.
2 The model
Consumers
The economy is inhabited by an equal number of high-skilled and low-skilled
individuals, each of whom is endowed with one unit of time. They derive
utility from the consumption of commodities and leisure time, denoted by ci









with α < 1. Each unit of labour supplied earns a gross wage of wi, which is
taxed at a uniform rate τ in order to ﬁnance a minimum amount of neces-
sary government expenditures equal to E.2 Apart from supplying Li hours
of labour, the individual needs a ﬁxed amount of ζ services, which can be
2Allowing for a progressive tax system with diﬀerent (marginal) tax rates for high-
skilled and low-skilled individuals would not qualitatively change our results. See also
Section 3.3.
3thought of as child care, household chores (cleaning, gardening) and repair-
ing work. These services are typically labour intensive and can either be
provided by the individual himself or bought on the market for services. We
assume one unit of service provision requires one unit of low-skilled labour,
so the market price of a service equals the gross hourly wage of a low-skilled
person, wu. This implies that only the high-skilled, whose wages are higher,
will potentially buy services. Let x be the part of service consumption by the
high-skilled that is bought on the market. This is determined by comparing
the gross wage of low-skilled labour to the net wage of high-skilled labour
(i.e., the opportunity cost of home provision of services). We can therefore
distinguish three cases:
 wu < (1   τ)ws ) x = 1,
 wu = (1   τ)ws ) 0 < x < 1,
 wu > (1   τ)ws ) x = 0.
In the ﬁrst case, the market for services is completely utilized. In the second
case, the market for services is partly utilized, while in the last case, this
market does not exist at all. In the latter two cases, this implies that high-
skilled individuals use part of their time for home provision of services by
giving up some hours of labour in the commodity sector, in which they are
–by deﬁnition– more productive than low-skilled individuals.
The individual budget restriction for low-skilled individuals can then be
written as
c
u = (1   τ)w
u(1   ζ   v
u), (2)
and for high-skilled individuals as
c
s = (1   τ)w
s(1   (1   x)ζ   v
s)   xζw
u (3)





1 + [(1   τ)wu]=(−1), (4)
L
s =
1   (1   x)ζ + xζwu[(1   τ)ws](1−)
1 + [(1   τ)ws]=(−1) . (5)
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with µ  1 and ℓs, ℓu being the input of high and low-skilled labour, whose
substitution elasticity is given by 1/(1 µ). Furthermore, γ > 1, denoting the
fact that the high-skilled are more productive in the commodity sector than
low-skilled individuals. High-skilled only work in the commodity sector, i.e.,
Ls = ℓs. Assuming perfect substitutability of low-skilled labour between the
commodity sector and (home and market) service provision,3 we can write
the supply of low-skilled labour to the commodity sector as
ℓ
u = L
u   xζ. (7)
Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms implies that the wage of high and low-skilled



























Note that these wages depend on the hours of labour supplied to the com-
modity sector, which in their turn depend on the amount of services that the
high-skilled buy on the market for services.
3 Market distortions
In this section, we show the eﬀects of labour taxes and service subsidies for
diﬀerent degrees of substitutability between low and high-skilled labour in
the production process. First, we focus on complete substitutability (µ = 1),
then on the intermediate case of a substitution elasticity equal to 1 (µ = 0).
Finally, the case of complementarity is analysed (for which we take µ =  10).
3This is a common assumption, made by e.g. Lindbeck (1982), Sandmo (1990) and
Kleven et al. (2000). An exception is Rosen (1995), whose conclusions hinge on the
assumption of rather low substitutability between market and home produced day care.
53.1 Perfect substitutability
If high and low-skilled labour are perfectly substitutable in the production
of commodities (µ = 1), (6) is a linear function and wages are exogenously
given by ws = γ and wu = 1. This implies that the relative price of home
services and market services does not change in response to changes in de-
mand. Depending on the values of τ and γ, either the market for services is
completely utilized (x = 1)4, or does not exist at all (x = 0). The latter is
the case if τ > 1   1/γ  ¯ τ.
Note that according to (5), with a Cobb-Douglas utility function (α = 0),
high-skilled labour supply does not depend on the net wage as long as no
services are purchased (x = 0), since the income and substitution eﬀect of
a change in the net wage cancel out. However, if the tax rate is below ¯ τ, x
has reached its maximum and does not change if w is marginally changed. A
lower value of the net wage then only causes a negative income eﬀect leading
to a higher labour supply. This implies that in that case, labour supply
depends negatively on the net wage.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1.a,5 with linear production the Laﬀer
curve has two peaks: the ”normal” peak at τm;6 and an extra peak at τ = ¯ τ,
the tax rate above which the service market collapses. The optimal policy
depends on the initial value of the labour income tax. Let ˜ τ < τm be the
rate at which tax revenues without utilization of the services market is equal
4It is possible that the labour supply of low-skilled individuals is smaller than the
amount of services that the high-skilled want to buy. In that case, x = Lu= < 1 instead
of x = 1.
5The parameter values for this ﬁgure are  = 0:5 and  = 0:1. Table 1 provides an
indication of the fraction of time spent on services by individuals (which would actually be
an estimate for (1   x)), that is on average between 21 and 35%. However, because not
all of these services can be replaced by hired services, and some are likely to be pleasant
and therefore be part of leisure time in our model, we choose a ’safe’ value of 10% for .
The value of  is set such that with a tax rate of 40%, the resulting wage for high-skilled
is 50% higher than the wage for low-skilled. Although Acemoglu (2003) reports a skill
premium of 33% on average (see Table 1), the values found from comparing low-skilled
and high-skilled wages as reported by CBS Statistics Netherlands and the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics are much higher. We therefore take an intermediate value of 50%.
6Deﬁned as m  argmaxf[Ls()+Lu()]g. Throughout the paper we will assume
that tax rates are always below m.
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7to the maximum amount of revenues in case all services are hired.7 Then,
the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. If µ = 1 and τ 2 (¯ τ, ˜ τ], there exists a tax ˆ τ  ¯ τ that raises
the same amount of revenues E. The rst-best policy is to decrease the tax
rate to this lower tax ˆ τ.
In that case, the distortion of the services market is nulliﬁed: high-skilled
individuals will increase their labour supply to the sector in which they are
more productive, while low-skilled labour supply to the commodity sector will
be reduced. Because of perfect substitutability, the latter eﬀect is more than
oﬀset by the higher labour supply of high-skilled, and production increases.
Because the tax rate is reduced for all and wages do not change, this is a
Pareto-improving policy.
However, if τ 2 (˜ τ,τm], decreasing the wage tax to (slightly less than)
¯ τ generates a lower amount of tax revenues than E, which we assume to
be infeasible. As can be seen from Figure 1.b, this is especially so if pro-
duction is non-linear, i.e., if low and high-skilled labour are to some extent
complementary, which will subsequently be discussed.
3.2 Non-linear production
If labour of diﬀerent skill types are not perfect substitutes, the wages are
endogenous. Consequently, changes in tax rates that induce changes in labour
supply will cause general-equilibrium eﬀects that aﬀect the tax base and tax
revenues. This is clearly seen from comparing Figure 1.a and 1.b: if both
types of labour are less than perfect substitutes, the Laﬀer curve has only
one peak, and this peak occurs at a lower tax rate. Decreasing the tax rate to
stimulate the market for services is then not possible without also decreasing
tax revenues. Instead, it can be welfare-improving to introduce a subsidy θ
for each hour of services that is hired. This will reduce the price of a service
to (1   θ)wu and change the fraction of services purchased on the market to
x′  x. The costs of subsidization are ﬁnanced through a higher wage tax,
7Deﬁned as ˜   f > ¯  j lim"  [Ls() + Lu()] = ˜ [Ls(˜ ) + Lu(˜ )]g.
8though on the other hand, if eﬀective, the subsidy will boost labour supply
to Ls′ and thus increase the tax base, creating room for a lower tax rate,
which will subsequently also aﬀect low-skilled labour supply. Let τ′ be the










) = E + θx
′ζ. (10)
Furthermore, the following condition must hold,





< θ < τ
′. (11)
The left part of equation (11) ensures the subsidy is eﬀective, the right part
implies that the subsidy is lower than the tax on low-skilled labour and thus
warrants that only the high-skilled will use the subsidy to purchase services.8
We will illustrate the eﬀects of a service subsidy that satisﬁes conditions (10)
and (11) for diﬀerent values of the substitution elasticity, assuming an initial
tax rate of 40%.9 With an initial skill premium of 50% (ws/wu = 1.5), this
implies that we start from a situation that no services are purchased on the
market. For completeness, the eﬀects of a service subsidy are also shown for
the previous case of linear production (see Figures 2.a-f), together with the
eﬀects of a budgetary-neutral decrease of the tax rate. As discussed earlier,
the latter option is better as it allows for a larger tax decrease, labour supply
increase and utility gain.
Unitary substitution elasticity
With a unitary substitution elasticity (i.e., µ = 0), low and high-skilled







8This is to prevent a situation described by Rosen (1995) as ”[...] a large fraction of
women work [...] to take care of the children of other women who work [...] to take care
for the parents of the women who are looking after their children” (p. 5).
9As can be seen from Table 1, this is about the average in several OECD countries
(including social security taxes and VAT) for an individual with an average income. A
higher value would be applicable in case of the marginal wage tax.
9Figure 3.a10 shows that a subsidy of at least 10% is required to be eﬀective.
Only if θ = 38%, the market for services is completely utilized. As can be
seen from Figure 3.b, the wage tax can be decreased as the subsidy increases
because the tax base becomes larger: both labour supply of low and high-
skilled increases. Furthermore, the wage of the low-skilled increases because
of the higher demand for their services and the fact that more high-skilled
labour supply makes them more productive in the commodity sector due to
some degree of complementarity; this, together with a lower tax rate, raises
their utility. On the other hand, a higher subsidy has a negative eﬀect on
the wage earned by high-skilled individuals because of their increased labour
supply. Figure 3.f shows the eﬀects of a service subsidy on the utility of high-
skilled persons. For rather low levels of the subsidy, their utility increases
because the combined eﬀect of a lower tax and a lower net price of services
outweighs the lower gross wage received. As the subsidy gets larger, the wage
of low-skilled labour increases, so services become relatively more expensive,
while the lower wage for high-skilled labour decreases further. Raising the
subsidy to values higher than 22% makes the high-skilled worse oﬀ.
Concluding, with a moderate degree of substitutability between high and
low-skilled labour in the productive sector, a service subsidy between 10 and
20% is Pareto-improving. Moreover, it will also reduce inequality between
low and high-skilled individuals.
Complementarity
Figures 4.a-f show the eﬀects of a services subsidy in case µ =  10, so the
substitution elasticity of low and high-skilled labour in the production process
is very low.11 As can be seen in Figure 4.a, a subsidy of about 9% is at least
required to instigate the market for services. However, at the maximum level
of the subsidy, the market for services is still not completely utilized. High-
skilled individuals will supply more labour, which, together with the higher
demand for low-skilled labour, increases the wage of low-skilled workers. This
eﬀect is rather strong because of the high degree of complementarity and has
a positive eﬀect on low-skilled labour supply. Again, the growing tax base
10The values of  and  are set such that again, ws=wu = 1:5. The ﬁgures only show
the cases when a subsidy is eﬀective; for lower value of , x = 0.
11Lower values of  produce qualitatively similar results.
10allows for a lower wage tax rate, despite the costs of providing the subsidy, as
shown by Figure 4.b, but the decrease in the tax rate is less compared to the
previous cases. Figures 4.e and 4.f reveal that also now, low-skilled persons
always beneﬁt from a higher subsidy. They experience the largest utility gain
when θ is set at the highest possible level. On the other hand, high-skilled
individuals do not beneﬁt from a service subsidy at all. The small decrease in
the tax rate and net price of services cannot compensate for the lower gross
wage. So in this case, subsidizing services is not Pareto-improving, it merely
reduces inequality.
3.3 Tax-deductible service expenses
Instead of providing direct subsidies for each unit of services purchased, the
government can also make service expenses tax deductible (as in, e.g., Domeij
and Klein (2009)). If η denotes the degree of tax deductibility, the eﬀective
price of a service for a person with skill type i becomes (1   ητi)wu. When
both types of individuals face the same tax rate, as we assumed, this boils
down to an implicit subsidy of ητ, giving the same results as before. But
if tax rates are diﬀerent, e.g. because of a progressive tax system where
τs > τu, tax deductibility allows for subsidies to be diﬀerentiated by skill
type. With η = 100%, high-skilled individuals will always decide to purchase
all services; for lower values of η the eﬀects are the same as with a similar
subsidy of ητs. Low-skilled individuals on the other hand, will not purchase
services if η < 100%. The only diﬀerence with direct subsidies is therefore
that in case of a lower marginal tax rate for low-skilled, the maximum subsidy
that can be provided increases: with direct subsidization, the maximum rate
is determined by the tax rate of low-skilled labour, (τu)12 while in case of
tax deductibility, the maximum (implicit) subsidy equals the tax rate of the
high-skilled (τs). Whether providing direct subsidies or indirect subsidies
through the tax system is more suitable thus depends on whether a subsidy
larger than τu is desirable.
12See the second part of equation (11).
114 Conclusion
Concluding, we can say that the distortionary eﬀect of a wage tax on the
market for labour-intensive services depends crucially on the substitution
elasticity of low and high-skilled labour. If they are perfect substitutes, the
market for services is either completely utilized, or does not exist at all,
depending on the wage tax rate and the skill premium. In the latter case,
a suﬃciently lower wage tax can bring about substantial eﬃciency gains
and a service subsidy is not required (provided the initial tax is not too
high), resulting in a Pareto-improvement. If both types of labour are not
perfectly substitutable, but still quite good substitutes, a service subsidy
within a certain range can be Pareto-improving and beneﬁcial to all. For
lower degrees of substitutability, whether or not services should be subsidized
is a distributional matter: low-skilled beneﬁt, but the utility of high-skilled
decreases. The optimal level of the subsidy should then follow from applying
a social welfare function.
The results of this paper leave room for further research. One extension
would be to include a schooling decision, implying endogenous numbers of
low and high-skilled individuals. Another direction is to focus on more spe-
ciﬁc kinds of services, e.g. child care or old-age care, and allow for a variable
amount of services needed, e.g. by treating the fertility rate as an endogenous
decision or considering an ageing population. Furthermore, physical capital
can be included in the production function of commodities. This will aﬀect
the productivity and wages of diﬀerent skill types in a diﬀerent way, depend-
ing on the degree of substitutability. Because the capital stock is determined
by previous investments, which depend on past savings decisions, dynamics
will enter the analysis.
12Table 1: Tax rates, skill premium, time use and service subsidies in several
OECD countries
tax rate skill premium time use subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Denmark 52.7 59.9 24.7 n.a. n.a. 0.0 26.2 47.4
France 39.6 42.9 n.a. 0.21 0.40 11.8 11.6 25.0
Germany 51.8 57.1 30.1 0.21 0.36 10.1 42.9 42.0
Italy 41.1 48.9 n.a. 0.14 0.46 8.3 n.a. n.a.
Japan 24.1 29.3 n.a. 0.12 0.38 n.a. 20.2 17.7
Netherlands 46.3 52.9 26.6 n.a. n.a. 10.9 40.6 78.1
Sweden 41.4 61.1 31.9 0.21 0.31 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK 35.3 40.0 35.4 0.20 0.37 8.7 9.9 79.3
USA 31.5 35.8 51.4 0.21 0.35 n.a. 30.1 88.3
average 40.4 47.5 33.4 0.19 0.38 7.1 22.7 47.2
(1) Deﬁned as 1 
w
1+c , with w the average wage tax in 2008 (including central and sub-
central taxes, and social security contributions) and c the (standard rate of the) VAT,
for someone with an average wage (in %) (source: OECD Tax Database 2009)
(2) Idem, marginal wage tax
(3) Coeﬃcient on workers with a college degree or more relative to high school graduates
in a regression of log real annual gross wages on four education categories, mid/late 90s
(in %) (taken from Acemoglu (2003))
(4) Estimate for (1   x) for men: number of hours per day devoted to unpaid work and
care relative to total time devoted to unpaid work, care, leisure and paid work (source:
OECD Family Database 2009 (Time Use Survey))
(5) Idem, for women
(6) Estimate for , deﬁned as 
H 
L
1+H , with H the standard VAT rate and L the reduced
VAT rate applied to labour-intensive services such as social services, cleaning, minor re-
pairing etc. (in %) (source: European Commission (2009))
(7) Estimate for subsidy of child care services, deﬁned as child care beneﬁts, tax beneﬁts
and other beneﬁts relative to the child care fee, for a dual earner family with full-time
arrangements earning 167% of the average wage, in 2004 (in %) (source: OECD Benets
and Wages 2007)
(8) Idem, for a sole-parent family with full-time earnings of 67% of the average wage
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14Figure 2: Eﬀects of a service subsidy with τ = 40%, linear production (µ = 1)
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15Figure 3: Eﬀects of a service subsidy with τ = 40%, Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion (µ = 0)
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16Figure 4: Eﬀects of a service subsidy with τ = 40%, high and low-skilled
labour complements (µ =  10)
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